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Abstract 13 
Doping scandals can reveal unresolved tensions between the meritocratic values of 14 
equal opportunity + reward for effort and the ‘talentocratic’ love of hereditary privilege. 15 
Whence this special reverence for talent? We analyze the following arguments: (1) 16 
talent is a unique indicator of greater potential, whereas doping enables only temporary 17 
boosts (the fluke critique); (2) developing a talent is an authentic endeavor of ‘becoming 18 
who you are’, whereas reforming the fundamentals of your birth suit via artifice is an 19 
act of alienation (the phony critique); (3) your (lack of) talent informs you of your 20 
proper place and purpose in life, whereas doping frustrates such an amor fati self-21 
understanding (the fateless critique). We conclude that these arguments fail to justify a 22 
categorical preference for natural talent over integrated artifice. Instead, they illustrate 23 
the extent to which unsavory beliefs about ‘nature’s aristocracy’ may still be at play in 24 
the moral theatre of sports. 25 
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1. Intrinsic anti-doping, pro-talent arguments 29 
Doping is often discussed without defining what is meant by it, and when an attempt at 30 
explicit definition is made, most authors who set out to do so conclude that a largely 31 
undisputed definition is not to be found (see for instance Van Hilvoorde, Vos & De 32 
Wert 2007). This unsatisfactory situation caused the World Anti Doping Agency 33 
(WADA) to adopt a ‘positivistic’ legal definition of doping, namely: doping is whatever 34 
is on WADA’s prohibition list.i Nevertheless, for clarity’s sake we define doping here 35 
as a ‘family construct’ii made up out of the following components: doping is the use of 36 
an exogenous substance, device or method that enables enhanced physical ability by 37 
altering a person’s bodily make-up, beyond the ability level (a) that the (otherwise 38 
healthy and able-bodied) doper possessed before this use (bypassing or ‘short-cutting’ 39 
doping), (b) that the doper might come to possess if she were to apply maximized effort 40 
and enjoy optimal social and environmental circumstances (individual surpassing 41 
doping), (c) of the biological species the doper is (or was) a member of, i.e. homo 42 
sapiens (species surpassing doping).
iii
 We are mindful not to presuppose that doping is 43 
wrong: that is what needs to be proven, not assumed. 44 
 45 
 46 
 47 
 48 
 49 
Image 1: Three degrees of doping 50 
In this paper we deal exclusively with the question of doping’s intrinsic and categorical 51 
wrongness, suspending our judgment on all extrinsic or circumstantial issues.
iv
 The 52 
intrinsic question is: if doping were provided in a ‘best of all possible worlds’ wherein 53 
issues regarding health, equal access, free choice and all other extrinsic issues were 54 
resolved, would there still be something wrong with doping in competitive sport in 55 
itself?
v
 The authoritative World Anti Doping Code (WADC) and its signatories seem to 56 
Bypassing doping:  
enhances ability up to a 
level that could also be 
reached via better training, 
focus, dedication, 
nutrition, coaching, etc. 
Individual surpassing doping: 
Enhances ability up to a level 
that cannot be reached via 
such ways, but that remains 
within species boundaries 
Species surpassing doping: 
Enhances ability up to a 
‘superhuman’ level that 
cannot be reached via such 
ways and surpasses species 
boundaries  
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believe so. In its chapter on “The Fundamental Rationale for the World Anti Doping 57 
Code”, the WADC states: “Anti-doping programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically 58 
valuable about sport. This intrinsic value is often referred to as "the spirit of sport", it is 59 
the essence of Olympism; it is how we play true. […] Doping is fundamentally contrary 60 
to the spirit of sport.” (WADA 2009, 14) Read in isolation, this excerpt does not 61 
necessarily imply that doping is wrong in itself and thus wrong in any setting, but only 62 
that doping is always wrong when used within a sport. However, it is often argued that 63 
what is valuable in the Spirit of Sport and under threat from doping, are in fact 64 
principles with a universal validity, such as fair play and equal opportunity, as well as 65 
virtues such as dedication, courage and character (see the bullet point list of principles 66 
and virtues that are used to exemplify the Spirit of Sport in WADA 2009, 14). The 67 
world of sport is then seen as a ‘moral theatre’ in which such values and principles are 68 
put on explicit display (a view widely advocated in the world of sport, explicitly 69 
underlying the modern Olympic Movement, see Young 1996). This, then, is how we 70 
will conceive of the ‘Spirit of Sport’ here: as a virtue ethic requiring that the respectable 71 
athlete – to a certain extent and in confluence with many other, perhaps conflicting 72 
requirements – demonstrates not only some excellent physical performance, but also an 73 
adequately honorable character in doing so. We do not have the space here to justify 74 
such a virtue ethic as basic to proper sports. Rather, we take a virtue ethical conception 75 
of sports as a premise and proceed to investigate: (a) whether doping can indeed never 76 
be compatible with such a spirit of sport; and (b) whether deep attachments to natural 77 
talent are as readily compatible with such a spirit of sport as is often taken for granted. 78 
The intrinsic, categorical arguments against doping in competitive sport seem to run 79 
along three main lines, respectively based on the conviction that a proper athletic 80 
accomplishment should: (a) originate from proper origins, such as natural talent; (b) 81 
take place via proper, intentionally directed processes; and (c) result in proper, 82 
recognizably human outcomes (Sandel 2007; President’s Council on Bioethics 2003; 83 
Murray 2009); whereas doping would respectively turn that proper athletic 84 
accomplishment into something debasing, mechanistic and/or dehumanizing: 85 
Performance Natural Doped/Enhanced 
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Proper Origins 
 
From ‘given’, natural origins 
Praised as ‘gifts’, providing a sense of 
given place, purpose or predestination 
 
Proper, for sports should display who 
has been allotted greater/lesser talent 
From self-styled, artificial origins 
Denounced as ‘hyperagency’, 
eroding our sense of given place, 
purpose or predestination  
Improper, for it distorts the 
display of ‘real’, natural 
superiority/inferiority 
 
Proper 
Processes 
Through one’s inherent, endogenous 
bodily processes and one’s active 
intentional effort 
Praised as authentic accomplishments 
Through intrusive, exogenous 
means and by passively 
undergoing their influence 
Denounced as effortless & 
mechanistic 
 
Proper 
Outcomes 
 
‘Vitruvian’ 
Towards a perfected optimum within 
the normal, species-typical range 
 
Praised as perfected humanity 
‘Promethean’ 
Towards a distorted excess over 
and beyond the normal, species-
typical range 
Denounced as alienating 
dehumanization 
Image 2: The main intrinsic objections to doping
vi
 86 
Because of the relative lack of focused and sustained analyses of the intrinsic issues in 87 
the doping debate, we will further restrict ourselves, within the category of intrinsic 88 
arguments, to the first bone of intrinsic contention – Proper Origins.  89 
2. Talentocracy: fair play, or rigging the game for talent? 90 
From its inception, modern Olympic sport has been promoted as a meritocratic 91 
institution: palmam qui meriut ferat – may he who merits it win the prize – was the 92 
guiding motto of the trailblazing Olympian Games organized in England from 1850 93 
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onwards by Dr William Penny Brookes.
vii
 To realize this motto’s aspiration, an 94 
environment of ‘fair play’ needs to be put in place – an environment purged from 95 
(blatantly) unearned privileges and advantages. As such, the sports arena has often been 96 
heralded by the ideologues of the Olympic Movement as an artificially constructed 97 
ethical idyll in which one can escape from (and perhaps stage an attack on) the many 98 
undeserved privileges and their discriminatory protectionism in real world society. In 99 
fair, universal and classless sport, the ‘true, natural order’ is allowed to prevail, whereas 100 
daily life is replete with false hierarchies of privilege and deprivation, protectionism and 101 
discrimination which deeply obscure our view of who merits what she has and who 102 
doesn’t. Within the splendid isolation of the sports arena, organizers should ensure that 103 
all participants enjoy an “equal opportunity to perform” (Loland 2009, 163) insofar as it 104 
is logistically feasible (Dixon 2008). The closer we come to reaching this ideal of the 105 
‘fair opportunity principle’ (Loland 2009, 163), the more likely it becomes that the 106 
intrinsically most deserving person wins: irrelevant inequalities are equalized, so that 107 
the relevant inequalities can make (most of) the difference. Across the spectrum of 108 
athletic disciplines, organizing institutions seek to implement this fair opportunity 109 
principle to some satisfactory degree by neutralizing the distortive effect of irrelevant 110 
luck factors (possible ways of achieving this include intervening in significant 111 
disparities in the quality of equipment, position on the playing field, access to proper 112 
training facilities, etc.). 113 
However, with regard to one fundamental and highly decisive luck factor, the situation 114 
seems to be wholly reversed. Towards this particular luck factor, organizing institutions 115 
are determined to ensure that brute luck remains decisive in determining who comes out 116 
on top. That factor is natural talent. Indeed, today it is still widely advocated that sport 117 
ought to be – as former WADA president Richard Pound put it – “a humanistic 118 
endeavor to see how far you can go on your own talent” (Pound in CBC Sports Online 119 
2003). With this talent-centered take on the Spirit of Sport, Pound implicitly echoes 120 
some elements of the bygone ‘amateur’ sports doctrine, which remained the official 121 
doctrine of the IOC until it was discarded after the 1988 Olympics (after having been 122 
conceptually plagued and de facto hollowed out for decades, see Guttman 2002). 123 
According to this amateur Spirit of Sport, applying too much effort is undignified: an 124 
ideal athletic performance should well up from more or less spontaneous talent, and 125 
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training may only be engaged in leisurely – not too tenaciously, certainly not 126 
professionally. During the early Modern Olympics of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 127 
century, even being coached was seen as a disturbing degradation of the Spirit of Sport 128 
which demanded that an athlete should flourish on her own talent, not via the help of 129 
some external aid (Young 1996, 32). Similar to what is now often said of doping, such 130 
coaching aid would allow the athlete to circumvent her own lack of strategic cunning 131 
and motivational perseverance, and it would introduce a second entity (the coach) as a 132 
disruptive distinct origin to attribute the performance to.  133 
In part, amateurism was a blunt weapon of class distinction, wielded to exclude the 134 
working class (which Brookes, in his original modern Games, explicitly sought to 135 
include) merely for the snobbish joy of exclusivity. However, in its more refined 136 
renditions, such as those given by the ‘Muscular Christianity’ movement which inspired 137 
the Liverpool Olympic Festival of 1862, it is about cultivating the art of living of the 138 
‘well-rounded, chivalric and pious gentlemen’, a brittle internal spirit to be carefully 139 
protected against lowly motives. To ensure that the athletes came to the Games for the 140 
love of the game and not for the love or need of money, the original amateur Spirit of 141 
Sport shunned all who would attend for material gain. Also, the motives of the 142 
participants were to be screened in some way to be sure they were based on honor rather 143 
than “bestiality”, for as sport involves some measure of ‘ritualized aggression’, 144 
“athleticism can occasion the most noble passions or the most vile. [...] It can be 145 
chivalrous or corrupt, vile, bestial.” (Coubertin in Baker 1988, 330) Generalizing 146 
grotesquely, many Gentlemen Amateurs of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century sought to 147 
realize these aims by categorically excluding the entire working class from 148 
participation. 149 
But besides snobbery and a high-minded honor code, the Gentleman Amateur Spirit of 150 
Sport was also rooted partly in tendencies to believe that socially constructed classes 151 
were in fact hierarchies ordained by God (aristocratic beliefs) and/or Nature (social 152 
Darwinist and related beliefs). Such beliefs helped to resolve what we now see as a 153 
glaring contradiction between the painstaking efforts to ensure fairness for the upper 154 
class men on the sport field with the principled exclusion of the entire lower classes. 155 
The upper class men regarded themselves already, as a matter of imagined metaphysical 156 
fact, to be superior to the lower classes, so it was perfectly reasonable to have the upper 157 
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class men only compete amongst themselves. This discrimination was legitimized by 158 
appealing not to a difference in skill or proper motivation (although such fictions were 159 
also widespread), but to an essentialistic difference: the working class was literally 160 
perceived as of another class, as another kind of being, so that even if the working class 161 
would perform better when measured objectively, their performance would nonetheless 162 
be tainted by its ignoble origin: the body and mind not of a Gentleman, but of a 163 
proletarian brute.  164 
In time, the social struggle for equal opportunities managed to prove that the perceived 165 
inferiorities of the lower classes with regard to skill, motivation and essence were little 166 
more than smokescreens erected to protect the privileges of the well-off. Today, the 167 
Olympic Movement proudly claims that it has largely succeeded in realizing its 168 
commitment to proper ‘universalism’: there is now open access for all, regardless of 169 
class, creed, race, sex or any other purported essentialist difference which would stand 170 
in the way of universal eligibility to participate. However, in this paper we will 171 
investigate whether one such privilege-protecting obstacle to full universalism may still 172 
be in place: the requirement that one achieves athletic excellence only via the (more or 173 
less effortful) “cultivation or display of natural talents” (Sandel 2007, 28-29) which may 174 
(inadvertently) protect the privilege of those who have been referred to as the ‘natural 175 
aristocracy’ (Jefferson 1988 [1813], 387-391) or ‘lucky sperm club’ (Young 1958) and 176 
which we propose to denote more precisely as the athletic ‘talentocracy’, this being the 177 
societal class consisting of those who happen, through no merit of their own, to be born 178 
with a biological endowment advantageous to athleticism. We seek to answer the 179 
questions: is such talentocratic thinking at play in contemporary sports? If so, does this 180 
endanger the ‘equal opportunity to perform’viii of those who were perhaps less lucky in 181 
the natural lottery but seek to obtain a similarly advantageous bodily endowment via 182 
biotechnology?  183 
One may point out that the celebration of effort in our contemporary Spirit of Sport 184 
seems to show that we no longer value natural talent above all other origins of athletic 185 
ability. Indeed, in the wake of broader societal trends of increasing industriousness and 186 
social mobility, talent-driven amateurism has apparently been complemented by an 187 
ethic of effort-driven professionalism.
ix
 Elite sport today is no longer supposed to be a 188 
leisurely, genteel display of natural talent. Rather, the ethic of our contemporary “pro’s” 189 
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is all about the super-intensive, maximally efficient optimization of that talent. The cult 190 
of talent has been supplemented by a cult of effort, grit and determination, a 191 
meritocratic work ethic wherein the prize and praise should go to those who put in the 192 
most intentional effort to realize the potential provided by natural talent. Indeed, it has 193 
been supplemented, not replaced, it seems, because even if Pound’s Spirit of Sport 194 
invites you to “see how far you can go”, you still have to restrict yourself to “your own 195 
talent” as the proper material to draw on for your maximizing exercise.  196 
The implicit model of human flourishing, that Pound and like minds seem to draw on, 197 
can be clarified with the following GMO analogy. It is one thing to make a seed flourish 198 
into a strong, tall and many-flowered plant via nourishing environmental influencing: in 199 
doing so, we endeavor to see how far the seed can go based on the seed’s own natural 200 
(genetic) predisposition – the seed’s ‘talent’ if you will. It is something else, perhaps 201 
something wrong, to let our nourishing environmental influence penetrate the 202 
ontological membrane of the seed-itself: then we will slide from a discovering 203 
exploratory practice of seeing how far the seed can go on its own natural predispositions 204 
into a very different creative exploratory practice. We then not only discover what a 205 
seed is capable of, but instead begin to remake the seed. This is certainly somewhat 206 
confusing, and it may be very wrong. And if it is very wrong, it will probably be all the 207 
more so when sliding from discovering-exploration into creative exploration with 208 
humans. 209 
Perhaps this underlying discovery-creation distinction helps to explain why effort-210 
driven professionalism appears to have supplemented talent-driven amateurism not as 211 
an equal, but as a second best ethos. Consider once again two flower seeds: one is 212 
tossed aside and left unattended in poor soil, the other is meticulously exposed to the 213 
most nourishing environments – earthed in the best soil, given the perfect amounts of 214 
light and water, perfectly managed on all fronts to see how far the seed can go. 215 
Flourishing time comes around and lo: both seeds grow into equally strong, tall and 216 
many-flowered plants. Surely, the horticulturalist will be more impressed by the 217 
‘diamond in the rough’ plant which managed to come to full bloom unaided and in 218 
unwelcoming terrain than by the plant that flourished equally only by investing 219 
continuous effort to optimize its growth. Analogously, when considering the arguments 220 
of Richard Pound, Michael Sandel, Thomas Murray and many others, we perceive a 221 
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historical and ethical tension between the professional and the amateur mindset being 222 
resolved by ultimately letting talent trump effort – a ‘talentocratic’ conclusion: 223 
[S]triving is not the point of sports; excellence is. And excellence consists at least partly 224 
in the display of natural talents and gifts that are no doing of the athlete who possesses 225 
them. […] This is an uncomfortable fact for democratic societies. We want to believe 226 
that success, in sports and in life, is something we earn, not something we inherit. 227 
Natural gifts, and the admiration they inspire, embarrass the meritocratic faith; they cast 228 
doubt on the conviction that praise and rewards flow from effort alone. […] No one 229 
believes that a mediocre basketball player who works and trains even harder than 230 
Michael Jordan deserves greater acclaim or a bigger contract. The real problem with 231 
genetically altered athletes is that they corrupt athletic competition as a human activity 232 
that honors the cultivation and display of natural talents. (Sandel 2007, p28-29) 233 
For Sandel and many others, ultimately, talent still comes out on top when compared to 234 
effort, even when this creates enormous friction with the deeply entrenched meritocratic 235 
beliefs of modernity, as Sandel admits. Before we turn to our analysis of candidate-236 
justifications for such pro-talent, contra-doping valuations, we should clarify what is at 237 
stake for the Olympic Spirit of Sport. WADA, the IOC and other anti-doping advocacy 238 
groups regularly assert that their categorical anti-doping norm and their Spirit of Sport 239 
have universal validity: anti-doping Olympism presents itself not as one spirit among 240 
many, but as the basic concept of proper sport which underlies all reasonable 241 
conceptions of proper sport  (cf. Parry 2009, WADC 2009, IOC 2010). If one adds to 242 
this the assumption that all sports cultures existing within the bounds of reasonable 243 
moral pluralism do indeed accept the categorical anti-doping norm and Olympism, then 244 
such a factual consensus might be used to justify claims to universal regulative 245 
authority of institutions such as WADA and the IOC. In his discussion of Olympism, 246 
Parry for instance seems to hold that these connections (from universal aspiration to 247 
factual universal consensus to legitimate universal authority) can be made (Parry 2009, 248 
8). However, this implies that if a reasonable conception of the good athletic life can be 249 
construed which is permissive or positive towards certain doping practices, the assumed 250 
universal consensus across reasonable moral pluralism would not (necessarily) hold, 251 
and categorically anti-doping Olympism would be reduced to one particular spirit of 252 
sport that, even while having universal ambitions and remaining overwhelmingly 253 
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majoritarian, would not be able to exercise factual universal authority.
x
 In such a 254 
scenario, it would be inappropriate to impose the categorical anti-doping norm on sports 255 
communities who live by reasonable views of the good athletic life in which doping is 256 
not categorically rejected. 257 
2.1. Talent as greater potential & the fluke critique of doping 258 
A good common sense reason to categorically prefer talent over effort refers back to the 259 
seed-plant analogy. Imagine a 400 meter sprint where two runners, A and B, cross the 260 
finish line at the same time, but A has had to invest all his effort and falls to the ground 261 
panting, whereas B runs unexhausted toward the cameras to mimic a lightning bolt that 262 
travels at the speed of light. The exhausted A may be greatly appreciated for having 263 
made an excellent time, and for having demonstrated the impressive character traits of 264 
extraordinary determination and willpower. But with regard to athletic skill per se, 265 
athlete B can be admired more because he has clearly not exhausted all of his running 266 
capacity: compared to A, B still has a reservoir of untapped potential, and thus 267 
demonstrates by his lack of fatigue  that he has a potential for running skill superior to 268 
A’s. They may have crossed the line at the same time on this occasion, but should B 269 
choose to also invest the extraordinary perseverance of A, his performance would 270 
exceed A’s. In contrast, it is not an option for A to choose to also have a body like B’s. 271 
Therefore, when someone with a greater talent – understood here as a (natural) 272 
predisposition or aptitude for some remarkable capacity – ties with someone with a 273 
lesser talent, it is reasonable to infer that the more talented athlete has a greater athletic 274 
potential than his competitor. A clearly already exhausted all he has and does not have 275 
the option of obtaining extra talent, whereas B does seem to have the option of 276 
obtaining extra determination and exercising greater effort.  277 
However, when effective doping is possible, this partly sweeps the rug from under this 278 
commonsensical argument. Without doping as an option, A cannot gain an added 279 
predisposition as a matter of fact: there is literally no way to do so. If doping were to 280 
become an option, however, that factual barrier is lifted and what may keep A from 281 
gaining a similar aptitude becomes a matter of value: he now does have a way to do so, 282 
but perhaps a moral code forbids it. Therefore, as a preliminary conclusion, the 283 
argument about natural talent as the best indicator for greater potential loses its general 284 
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validity, because effective doping may just as well provide such great potential. What is 285 
more, theoretically it could even do so to a greater extent than the most attuned natural 286 
predisposition ever could. 287 
One could try to counter this by pointing out that doping practices as we know them 288 
today only enable a temporary boost of performance levels, whereas the presence of 289 
natural talent indicates a more durable, longer lasting potential for high-level 290 
performance – a predisposition proper. This argument may have some validity if one 291 
restricts one’s view to the effectiveness of contemporary doping technologies, but it 292 
would be an exaggerated simplification to say that, come what may, only natural talent 293 
can ever count as a truly reliable marker for long-lasting potential. We must not let the 294 
image of today’s pills, syringes and injection needles, and the often fleeting effects they 295 
bring about, obscure the fact that a plethora of current and future doping practices will 296 
not follow the lines of this ‘Popeye caricature’xi: doping taken up right before the 297 
performance is to be performed, bringing the body in a temporary high, resulting in a 298 
extraordinary strong performance, after which the enhancing effect fades away and it 299 
becomes evident that the athlete without the spinach/doping is, ‘in reality’, a less able 300 
athlete who could never have performed her feat ‘on her own’. 301 
What this Popeye caricature misses, is that long-lasting potential may also be obtained 302 
via certain forms of doping, for instance a doping agent that would secrete chemicals 303 
over a long space of time (contrast Popeye to Spiderman, Asterix to Obelix), or a 304 
permanent enhancing intervention such as today’s Lasik eye surgery that golfers 305 
undergo to provide them with better than 20/20 vision. We might one day develop a 306 
genetic intervention to bring down lactic acid production, which would endow cyclists 307 
with an enduring capacity to fatigue more slowly and recuperate more quickly 308 
(Mehlman 2009a, 62). Ergo, deeply integrated doping practices such as the very real 309 
Lasik eye lasering or the still theoretical lactic acid intervention seem immune to the 310 
fluke critique of doping. What is more, even if – counterfactually – not a single type of 311 
doping would ever be able to provide a potential for physical performance as profound 312 
or durable as natural talent, this alone does not suffice to categorically depreciate the 313 
acquisition of skills via doping – it would only mean that natural talent could be 314 
appreciated somewhat more as it would mark a somewhat more robust potential. In 315 
sum, it is an erroneous overgeneralization to hold that doping could only ever induce 316 
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fluke performances and that natural talent is and always will be the best proxy for 317 
deeply ingrained and durable predispositions. 318 
Would such deeply integrated doping then really equal the ‘deep potential’ that natural 319 
talent harbors in every respect? Ultimately, no. There is one fundamental dimension that 320 
eludes doping techniques. They lack the same fundamental thing a silicone-filled bosom 321 
lacks: contrary to naturally given traits, the deeply integrated athletic or aesthetic 322 
enhancements are no reliable markers of hereditary potential. In this sense, as long as 323 
the techniques do not induce a hereditary enhancement (which is not theoretically 324 
impossible), their effects are categorically more superficial and fleeting. Even if they 325 
would be so deeply integrated that they exert their enhancing influence flawlessly 326 
throughout the entire lifespan of the doper, perhaps even more reliably and robustly as 327 
natural talent ever would, their enhancing influence would never live on in their 328 
offspring. To the extent that sport competitions still are in part atavistic relics of the 329 
ritualized fighting between animals to demonstrate who is the alpha male or female (De 330 
Block and Dewitte 2009), doping would dramatically corrupt this primitive Spirit of 331 
Sport: to demonstrate who is ‘truly’, genetically superior with respect to physical 332 
prowess.
xii
 To the extent that we still are hardwired to seek out such reliable markers of 333 
hereditary physical superiority, doping, like silicone, frustrates.
xiii
 From the perspective 334 
of this primal evolutionary-psychological craving, which is itself highly dubious and 335 
dangerous as a normative stance (even gravitating towards the ‘fascistoid’ according to 336 
bio-ethicist Torbjörn Tännsjö, see Tännsjö 2000), they can be regarded as superficial, 337 
‘fake’ and categorically inferior abominations that corrupt this primal point to sports. 338 
This may be a way to flesh out Eric Juengst’s suggestion that deeper reflection on the 339 
widespread categorical objection to doping may reveal how many still turn to sport to 340 
“glorify a genetic prejudice that the world is working hard to evolve beyond in other spheres of 341 
human life.” (Juengst 2009, 176-177)  342 
2.2. Talent as the true self & the phoney critique of doping
xiv
 343 
Precisely by resolving the fluke objection (save for the hereditary dimension, although 344 
that might also be resolved by considering for instance germline genetic doping), the 345 
deep integration of doping can raise a new set of objections on an altogether different 346 
and perhaps more fundamental plane. On this plane, succeeding only all too well in 347 
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endowing the athlete with a predisposition to perform in  a manner equivalent or even 348 
superior to natural talent becomes the problem. The deeper cause for concern is this: by 349 
implanting such novel (perhaps more enabling and superficially satisfying) 350 
predispositions, one may betray the (perhaps more incapacitating and superficially 351 
frustrating) predispositions that are properly one’s own, that make up the essence of 352 
who one is. The more permanently and profoundly one modifies one’s own inherent 353 
capabilities – and doping does exactly that – the more one ‘tries to be somebody else’, 354 
the more one turns into a ‘phony’. Doping, therefore, might deeply undermine personal 355 
authenticity.  356 
In light of this deeper danger, critics like Carl Elliot and Howard Baillie call for an ethic 357 
of authenticity, more precisely an ethic of affirmative authenticity. (Elliot 2003; Baillie 358 
2005) In such an ethic, self-exploration is conceived of as (primarily) self-discovery (cf. 359 
supra): drawing out what is already inside of you, as opposed to drawing in alien things 360 
from the outside. In the face of human enhancement interventions, this ethic would 361 
imply that one accepts and affirms, conserves and cultivates at least those elements of 362 
one’s biology that are constitutive to one’s individual identity. This general authenticity 363 
argument can be invoked with extra vigor in the field of sport and doping. Articulating 364 
the more fundamental reasons of why sport may be of great ethical value, several 365 
philosophers have characterized sport as a ‘spiritual exercise’ of self-discovery. While 366 
sport may often seem to be all about Citius, Altius, Fortius – that is: about transgressing 367 
given physical boundaries and striving towards “superhuman performance” (Savulescu, 368 
Foddy and Clayton 2004: 666) – this apparently transgressive practice can also be 369 
understood as an on-going approximative discovery of the eventual, ultimate boundaries 370 
of one’s given potential – a practice akin to optimally nurturing a seed but refraining 371 
from remaking the seed. Sport can thus be engaged in as the intensive gauging of the 372 
inner depths and outer contours of one’s ‘true self’. The reward of intensive sporting 373 
then lies not only in the pride one can take in excellent performance, but also the 374 
valuable existential self-understanding one gains by it. This existential dimension is 375 
expressed in such widespread sporting slogans as “show what you are made of”, “find 376 
out what you have in you”, “stretch yourself to the limit”.xv  377 
Viewed from this perspective, doping now presents itself as a diametrically opposed 378 
practice of self-alteration. For that reason doping can be said to be fundamentally at 379 
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odds with the Spirit of Sport: instead of showing us what someone is made of, it makes 380 
that someone anew. By redrawing one’s given physical boundaries instead of 381 
approximating them, doping blurs precisely what the ethic of affirmative authenticity 382 
wanted to bring into sharp focus. Such arguments help to explain why doping can be 383 
considered as a form of cheating not in the superficial sense of breaking a conventional 384 
agreement that no one is to use stimulants (just as no soccer player is allowed to carry 385 
the ball over the field in his hands), but cheating in a more profound sense as cheating 386 
oneself in becoming a fake, a phony, a fraud – denying and corrupting who one ‘really 387 
is’ or ‘was cut out to be’.  388 
However, the disorienting effects of human enhancement interventions must not be 389 
exaggerated and must also be properly compared to the way in which our natural, 390 
unenhanced body may be disorienting and alienating to us, too. Firstly, as for instance 391 
David DeGrazia makes philosophically plausible (DeGrazia 2005) and Peter Kramer 392 
backs up empirically (Kramer 1993), it is quite possible that identity-altering 393 
enhancements, even radical ones that directly intervene in one’s mental life, may be 394 
solicited by certain persons, welcomed at the moment of the intervention, positively 395 
assessed afterwards and seamlessly appropriated as a core feature of the person’s 396 
’narrative identity’. Such interventions may even serve to conserve a given identity. For 397 
instance, we can readily imagine a subset of doping practices engaged in to preserve 398 
one’s youthful skill levels into older age, thus making the self more rather than less 399 
stable, at least in one regard. Secondly, it can be called into question whether a 400 
pharmacologically or prosthetically enhanced body must in all cases be more 401 
disorienting than one’s default, nature-given bodily endowment. Applying this to 402 
doping, when it is engaged in mindfully and autonomously, in order to realize an 403 
athletic life project that is of fundamental value to a person, it may well be that in her 404 
doped state, she will experience a heightened sense of authenticity (we could label this 405 
‘aspirational authenticity’, distinguishable from ‘affirmative authenticity’) and that she 406 
will appropriate and affirm her newly enabled body as properly and proudly hers, where 407 
she may have felt out-of-place and ill-at-ease in her default, nature-given body which 408 
lacked the sufficient capacity to adequately realize her fundamental life project. Thirdly, 409 
drawing on a more philosophical and undoubtedly less common motivation, 410 
enhancement could also be engaged in as an explicit gesture to affirm the burdensome 411 
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reality that we are ‘self-shaping animals’ whether we like it or not, thus displaying the 412 
virtues of moral courage and epistemic dignity (cf. infra). In the same vein, 413 
enhancement could be engaged in as an act of ‘civil disobedience’ against the 414 
evolutionary forces that shaped our Homo sapiens nature. Insofar as sports are a form of 415 
moral and existential theatre (Pound 2004; Baker 1988), the use of doping could be a 416 
dramatic, public exemplification of this affirmation of our self-shaping dignity, and a 417 
public repudiation of the supposed duty to be natural (Bonte 2011 and 2012; Levy 418 
2011).   419 
Based on these three arguments, there seems to be no good reason why people should 420 
categorically be denounced for critically reviewing their own natural predicament and 421 
deciding that their biological inheritance could use some ‘civil engineering’. However, 422 
the ‘true self’ objections raised here do contain considerable value if we properly tone 423 
them down into  non-essentialistic, scientifically warranted arguments that we should 424 
pay close attention to the possible psychological effect of “spiraling self-doubt” 425 
(McKibben 2003, 55) if one uses doping or other human enhancement interventions too 426 
abruptly, too erratically or in any other way damaging to a valued sense of personal 427 
coherence and continuity (Kramer 1993; DeGrazia 2005). We must not let the mere 428 
possibility of all sorts of enhancement muddle the pivotal practical wisdom that it may 429 
still be best, all things considered, to appreciate and be content with the capacities one 430 
already has (Buchanan 2011, 69-114). As such, however, the ‘true self’ objection turns 431 
out to be not a categorical one about intrinsic, inextinguishable features of doping, but a 432 
precautionary one about extrinsic eventualities of some doping practices, that again, 433 
need not be overgeneralized. 434 
2.3. Talent as a true gift & the fateless critique of doping 435 
Resolving the phony objection may not suffice to quell all concern about proper origins 436 
of athletic ability. Instead, that very resolution may once over give rise to a new set of 437 
objections on an even more fundamental plane than that of personal authenticity. That 438 
even deeper cause for concern is this: precisely by heeding the moral call of his 439 
aspirational  authenticity only all too well, the ‘self-made man’ may come to neglect the 440 
respect he owes not to his self, but to the forces that made him. Changing the 441 
fundamentals of how one was created, as doping arguably does, overrides one’s natural 442 
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biological blueprint. This overriding can be seen as a moral transgression: one should 443 
stay true to something more, something deeper, than one’s ‘ego’. Perhaps this is where 444 
the intuition comes from that the ‘gifted athlete’, like the ‘natural beauty’, deserves 445 
special reverence: she got her special gift from nature, whereas the doper helped herself 446 
to a gift.  447 
In a particular religious mindset, for instance, one can perceive one’s body to be literally 448 
given by some wise and benign giver. Arguably, one mustn’t squander a benign and 449 
wisely given gift, nor should one be discontent with it. Ideally, one rejoices in the gift 450 
and makes the best of it without asking for a greater gift. From this perspective, good 451 
sports could be an outright religious practice in which pious athletes, having been 452 
endowed with special natural talents, prove their gratefulness to their creator by 453 
cultivating and displaying those special bodily gifts they received –  this is indeed a 454 
pivotal theme in the theology of sports (Weir 2011). The Spirit of Sport may then be 455 
religiously rephrased as: may the most blessed man win. The founder of the IOC, Pierre 456 
de Coubertin, and many of his 20
th
 century successors, such as Avery Brundage, were 457 
convinced that the spirit of Olympic sport did indeed consist in a universal, modern 458 
religiosity (Guttman 2002), premised in part on a deep attachment to the giftedness of 459 
natural talents. Today, current IOC president Jacques Rogge asserts that “the religious 460 
aspect has now totally disappeared” (Rogge in Braeckman et al. 2011, 83), yet the 461 
appreciation of sports as a display of the giftedness of natural talent remains common. 462 
To resolve this tension, Michael Sandel has set out to argue for the fundamental value 463 
of giftedness in sports (and in life in general) without drawing on (overtly) religious 464 
argument. In the chapter “Bionic Athletes” of his book The Case Against Perfection, 465 
Sandel writes: 466 
The deeper danger is that [human enhancement interventions] represent a kind of 467 
hyperagency, a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, including human 468 
nature, to serve our purposes and satisfy our desires. […] To acknowledge the 469 
giftedness of life is to recognize that our talents and powers are not wholly our 470 
own doing, nor even fully ours, despite the efforts we expend to develop and to 471 
exercise them. […] It is, in part, a religious sensibility. But its resonance reaches 472 
beyond religion. (Sandel 2007, 26-27). 473 
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Sandel advances two closely connected objections to doping: (1) doping represents that 474 
Promethean aspiration; and (2) doping entails a failure to acknowledge the giftedness of 475 
life. We believe the first accusation may be too harsh and overgeneralizing, and the 476 
second to be open to a respectful difference of opinion. 477 
In line with Allen Buchanan’s reply to Sandel (Buchanan 2011, 69-114), it seems more 478 
prudent and precise to nuance that first accusation into a probabilistic statement: doping 479 
may in specific contexts represent a ‘hyperagency-like’ aspiration to remake nature to 480 
serve our purposes and satisfy our desires. Perhaps, in the contemporary Western 481 
culture of professionalism and perfectionism, such a drive towards absolute mastery 482 
over one’s biological constitution may indeed be a common risk against which we do 483 
well to warn. And several entrenched contemporary doping cultures, such as those 484 
surrounding anabolic steroids or erythropoietin, may indeed be deeply marked by an 485 
obsessive drive towards mastery and perfection. But surely, there may be many other, 486 
less troublesome motives to engage in biotechnological alterations of one’s bodily 487 
capacities, such as the active curiosity to seek out new aesthetics of embodiment and of 488 
athletic virtuosity. What is more, in answering Sandel’s second objection, we find that 489 
doping might even be engaged in precisely out of a deep recognition and 490 
acknowledgement of something that is fatalistically given to any human person: not so 491 
much a given biological blueprint, but rather the given responsibility over oneself. As 492 
such, when one should actively take the fundamentals of one’s own biology into one’s 493 
own hands and reshape them, this need not be rooted in an aspiration for mastery and 494 
perfection. It need not even be rooted in aspiration, period. It may be rooted in the 495 
earnest, fatalistic acceptance of the burden of responsibility over oneself: an acceptance 496 
of the self-understanding of oneself as a ‘self-shaping animal’ (cf. supra). In this light, 497 
the opposite position of feeling compelled to stay true to one’s given biological 498 
constitution may also come with a risk of being inspired by a lack of virtue, and in some 499 
cases even by vice. It may be inspired by the desire to escape a too great responsibility 500 
and too disorienting freedom to shape one’s own existence. The escape plan then lies in 501 
choosing to conceive of oneself – perhaps counterfactually – as a creature that should 502 
stay true to how it was created. In this way, one may outsource substantial amounts of 503 
burdensome decisional responsibilities over what one should maintain and what one 504 
should change about one’s biological constitution to that (created?) creator. This may be 505 
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a choice for psychological comfort – going with the natural flow of things – over 506 
epistemic and moral courage – feeling honor-bound to actively take responsibility over 507 
one’s own existence. From such a general existentialist position, a non-essentialist, non-508 
perfectionist Spirit of Sport may sprout, in which (prosthetic and doped) sport is 509 
engaged in as ‘a virtuous exploration of bodily virtuosity’.  510 
If the point is granted that this might be so, even if only in certain marginal cases, it 511 
seems advisable to respect such (and perhaps only such) doping practices as part of the 512 
respectful disagreement between certain religious and humanistic conceptions of the 513 
good athletic life which both fall within the bounds of reasonable moral pluralism.  514 
3. Concluding remarks 515 
Summarizing the conclusions of this critique of the talentocratic Spirit of Sport, we 516 
argued that all three anti-doping objections fall short as categorical objections but do 517 
have significant residual value as extrinsic, prudential arguments. Firstly, the arguments 518 
on natural talent as greater potential alert to the eventuality that certain doping practices 519 
will not be an equally trustworthy indicator of profound or long lasting potential as 520 
natural talent. However, deeply integrating doping may resolve this, although it may 521 
still lack the feature of being an indicator of hereditary traits. Then again, if the Spirit of 522 
Sport would consist in the demonstration of hereditary superiorities, that spirit would be 523 
an ethically dubious relic of evolutionary psychology. Secondly, the arguments on one’s 524 
(lack of) natural talents as a part the true self alert to the eventuality that if one engages 525 
in doping practices without paying due attention to how this fits with one’s affirmative 526 
and aspirational authenticity, it may possibly result in profound disorientation about 527 
who one is and what one should be doing with oneself. Nevertheless, doping could also 528 
be engaged in mindfully in order to achieve greater authenticity. Moreover, profound 529 
authenticity problems may also arise from not using available means for altering one’s 530 
natural endowment. Finally, the arguments about natural talent as a true gift alert to the 531 
possibility that the use of doping may be rooted in a problematic drive towards mastery 532 
and perfectionism. Nevertheless, it may also be rooted in the humanistic dignity of 533 
feeling honor-bound to take full responsibility over one’s own existence, including over 534 
one’s own biological constitution, which may be integrated in a non-essentialist, non-535 
perfectionist Spirit of Sport of “the virtuous exploration of bodily virtuosity” as opposed 536 
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to the “virtuous perfection of natural talent”. Moreover, there seems to exist a converse 537 
risk, that the categorical anti-doping position may be rooted in a problematic urge to 538 
outsource such responsibilities over oneself, in order to maintain an easy and 539 
comfortable sense of ‘naturally given’ place and purpose.  540 
In our exploration of what might constitute proper origins of athletic ability, we have 541 
found it possible to have a reasonable conception of the good athletic life which permits 542 
or even lauds profound corporeal alteration via artifice. However, an exploration of 543 
further intrinsic issues concerning Proper Processes and Proper Outcomes may reveal 544 
insurmountable intrinsic objections to doping nonetheless. What is more, even if doping 545 
would ultimately be found intrinsically permissible or laudable on all fronts, an 546 
exploration of the many extrinsic objections to contemporary doping practices such as 547 
health-related harms, indirect coercion, rule-breaking etc. may still lead one to conclude 548 
that (virtually all) contemporary doping practices necessarily imply impermissible 549 
conditions. Therefore, one might accept our current argument and still argue, anno 550 
2013, for a ban of all contemporary doping practices until proven that those 551 
impermissible conditions are sufficiently alleviated. The crucial difference, however, 552 
would be that, for want of intrinsic objections, such bans would cease to be based on 553 
‘anti-doping’ grounds, but rather on ‘anti-unhealthiness’, ‘anti-peer pressure’ or some 554 
other such (aggregate) grounds.  555 
Although any given sports institutions could still organize sports on categorical anti-556 
doping grounds as long as it grants other institutions the right to organize sports on 557 
doping-neutral or pro-doping grounds, sports institutions based on Olympism face a 558 
particular challenge if no intrinsic objections can be found which all reasonable moral 559 
communities should accept. Given the universalist ambition of Olympism to include ‘all 560 
games for all peoples’ (Parry 2009), how should the Olympic Movement respond to the 561 
jarring figure of the reasonable, virtue-ethical doper? If the commitment to universal 562 
inclusivity outweighs the attachment to natural talent, it seems that she should in 563 
principle be welcomed and that, once forms of doping unburdened by decisive extrinsic 564 
objections are made available, provisions should be made to accommodate her. If 565 
instead the attachment to natural talent trumps the commitment to inclusivity, the 566 
Olympics may have to check its doctrine of universalism and clarify that it will host 567 
only ‘all games for all natural peoples’.   568 
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i
 The list is not baseless, however. Criteria to be put on the list are (1) possible performance enhancing 
effect, (2) possible health risk, and (3) against the Spirit of Sport (henceforth: Spirit of Sport), where 
meeting only two of these three criteria suffices to be dubbed doping. (WADA 2009) 
ii
 Similar to the WADC definition where the presence of two out of three components suffice to hold 
something to be doping, for family constructs not all components have to be present in every individual 
instance of doping, but there is nevertheless adequate persisting (‘familial’) similarity between all 
instances. 
iii
 These can be thought of as three successive frontiers: a doping practice may bring about transgression 
(a), but not yet (b) and c); (a) and (b), but not yet (c), or (a), (b) and (c). It is interesting to mention the 
possibility of ‘leapfrog technologies’, of which the running blades of Oscar Pistorius might be a 
contemporary example, wherein a therapeutic intervention may not only restore health or ability but at 
the same time, perhaps even inextricably, effectuate all of these enhancing transgressions, for instance 
by developing prostheses that are in certain respects superior to conventional homo sapiens biology. 
iv
 Circumstantial issues are, of course, crucial in reaching a conclusion on what to do with doping as it 
exists today. Even if doping may turn out to be permissible or even – ex hypothesi – laudable in itself, 
such neutral or positive valuations can be easily outweighed, when one is deciding on some particular 
doping practice in some particular sports context in a particular day and age, where countless 
contingencies should weigh in on such context-specific decision making. However, even if such extrinsic 
concerns would outweigh an intrinsic neutral or positive valuation of doping, even an extremely 
negative valuation of particular doping practices can only be called an ‘anti-doping’ position proper if 
something intrinsic to doping would be found decisively negative. Otherwise is would be a ‘anti-
unhealthiness’, ‘anti-peer pressure’ or some other such (aggregate) position.  Contemporary anti-doping 
positions often present themselves as full-blooded anti-doping positions proper, premised on an 
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intrinsic denunciation of doping. In this vein, the World Anti Doping Code states:  “Anti-doping programs 
seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable to sports. […] Doping is fundamentally contrary to the 
spirit of sport”. (WADC 2009: 14) To give clear and sustained attention to these core arguments, we 
must suspend an ethical analysis of the contingent features of doping practices prevalent today – such 
as the periodic intake of pharmaceutical substances which induce fleeting effects and come with grave 
health risks. 
v
 As, for instance, there seems to be something profoundly wrong with the healthy, abundantly available 
and non-coerced contentment-inducing ‘soma’ drug in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. (2006 [1946]) 
vi
 This table is not intended to be exhaustive, nor to state a particular and supposedly proper use of the 
labels ‘unnatural’, ‘inauthentic’ and ‘dehumanizing’, as these labels can and often are used in other 
contexts. 
vii
 Brookes is one of the often forgotten precursors of Pierre de Coubertin, the French Baron who went 
on to found the international Games we still know today and who is often – incorrectly – portrayed as 
the lone visionary who founded the modern Olympic Movement. For a detailed history of the early 
modern Olympic movement(s), see Young 1996. 
viii
 We limit our discussion of the ‘equal opportunity to perform’ to questions of equal eligibility and 
admission. Further questions of equal (re)distribution (of talent and of doping) will not be addressed 
here, as our arguments can be made without settling these questions. We would, however, briefly note 
that the argument we present in this paper remains compatible with views on just redistribution from 
one end of the spectrum to the other: uncompromising luck egalitarian views in which all ‘unfair 
(biological) advantages’ must be undone (for instance by handicapping the talented or by enhancing the 
less-talented) so that every member of a community of equals may come to enjoy ‘equal (biological) 
opportunity’; uncompromising libertarian views of ‘fortunocracy’ in which individuals are left free to 
exploit for personal gain any good fortune that may come their way – financial capital, social capital, 
cultural capital, bio-capital and biotech-capital alike; and any position in between. For a luck egalitarian 
argument for handicapping the talented (for instance via point leads or head starts for the less talented) 
so that sports competitions can better track ethically relevant differentials such as character and effort, 
see Mehlman 2009b. See Murray 2009 for a critical response in the same volume. For a thorough 
analysis of the notion that perhaps the entirety of one’s constitution may be ‘predetermined all the way 
down’, one’s character and capacity for effort included, and thus wholly a matter of luck for which one 
cannot be held accountable, see Hurley 2002. 
ix
 Money-driven professionalism – that is: sport as a true profession that supports one in one’s livelihood 
– has also become dominant, although merely as something permitted as a socioeconomical reality, 
whereas  effort-driven professionalism has become dominant as an ethical aim. 
x
 Adherents of anti-doping Olympism may of course still believe that others are (reasonably) mistaken, 
and that their Spirit of Sport truly reflects the only proper way to play sports, and thus still try to 
convince others, non-coercively, of the wrongness of their ways. 
xi
 Curiously, Popeye is designed and accepted as a very loveable character, even if his relation to spinach 
is eerily similar to taking periodic shots of (healthy) doping.  
xii
 Similarly spirited, many mainstream beauty pageants place a deep taboo, and regularly prohibitive 
regulations, on aesthetic surgeries as these also dramatically corrupt the primal urge to discern who is 
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innately superior with respect to beauty, which proxies for fertility and for the heredity of the beauty 
itself. 
xiii
 Here is not the place to pursue this fully, but it may prove fruitful to further tie this in with 
evolutionary psychological analyses on the pervasiveness of mimicry as an evolutionary adaptive 
strategy, and how this created a deep evolutionary dynamic towards fine-tuned mechanisms for fake 
detection and the creation of testing situations in which an organism can probe and provoke proof of 
the actual traits of relevant others such as competitors, mates, kin, natural enemies and symbiotic 
partners. 
xiv
 This set of arguments is closely connected to the ‘Proper Processes’ concerns which require 
adequately active agency by the athlete as an person, so that the athletic performance can be ascribed 
to that athlete as a proper accomplishment of her. However, here we suspend that further discussion on 
active agency and delve deeper into the origins-issue of what falls within and without the self, and how 
one may integrate novel ways of being into one’s authentic self-conception, a question preceding the 
active/passive distinction. 
xv
 For any sport hobbyist this is true on the individual level, but a  reason why the absolute top athletes 
are so revered may be that they are seen to reveal such an existential insight on a species level: at the 
Olympic Games, we appear to find out something about what ‘mankind’ is capable of, what mankind 
truly is. This crucial thought strengthens the emphatic connection of the spectators with their sport 
heroes. In global top sports, people from around the world can collectively rejoice in the most excellent 
performances given by the top crop of the great in-group of mankind. This exalted sentiment has always 
been at the heart of Pierre de Coubertin’s and the IOC’s vision of the Olympic Games as a humanistic 
endeavor to inspire fellow feeling between all human beings. (Young 1996) However, an argument 
against doping on these grounds would then be epistemic or aesthetic, rather than ethical. We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this ethical-aesthetical distinction. 
